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SYMPOSIUM
FOREWORD: THE CONSTITUTION
OF RESPONSIBILITY
Steven G. Calabresi t
Gary Lawson tt
The American legal academy is decidedly nationalistic. Com-
parative law tends to be a minor part of the law school curriculum,
and discussion of alternative legal systems almost never finds its way
into mainstream courses like constitutional law. As a result, much
that is distinctive about American constitutionalism, and the Ameri-
can legal system in general, is often taken for granted. The federal
Constitution, for example, says much about governmental structure,
power, and limitations, but virtually nothing about the obligations
of citizens to one another or to the government.' This feature of
the American Constitution starkly sets it apart from many of its for-
eign counterparts. On the international scene, the responsibilities
of individual citizens are a major topic of constitutional
conversation.
A few examples will illustrate the point. The 1947 Italian Con-
stitution expressly guarantees to citizens "the inviolable rights of
man," but also "imposes the performance of unalterable duties of a
political, economic and social nature."'2 More particularly, article 4
declares that "[e]very citizen shall undertake, according to his pos-
sibilities and his own choice, an activity or a function contributing to
the material and moral progress of society"; 3 and Part One of the
document, entitled "Rights and Duties of Citizens," proclaims a
number of specific citizen obligations, such as the duty to support
and educate one's children, 4 the duty to vote,5 and the duty to con-
t Assistant Professor, Northwestern University School of Law.
tt Associate Professor, Northwestern University School of Law.
1 The one exception is the Thirteenth Amendment. There is plainly nothing
about citizen obligations in the constitutional text or the Bill of Rights.
2 COSTrrUZIONE art. 2 (Italy), translated in CONsTrrLrrxONS OF THE COUNTIES OF THE
WORLD 47 (Albert P. Blaustein & Gisbert H. Flanz eds. & Gisbert H. Flanz trans., 1987).
3 Id. art. 4.
4 Id. art. 30.
5 Id. art. 48.
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tribute to public expenditures in proportion to one's resources. 6
The 1978 Spanish Constitution similarly contains a section on "The
Rights and Duties of Citizens,"' 7 which specifies such civic obliga-
tions as the duty to work,8 the duty to support one's children,9 and
the duty to preserve "an environment suitable to the development
of the person."' 10 And perhaps the best-known example is the con-
stitution of the former Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, whose
1977 version proclaims that "[t]he exercise of rights and freedoms
is inseparable from the performance by the citizen of his duties '"'
and lists such obligations as the duties to "safeguard and strengthen
socialist property,"12 to be "intolerant of anti-social behavior,"' 8 to
"protect nature and safeguard its riches,"' 14 and to "promote the
development of friendship and cooperation with peoples of other
countries and the maintenance and strengthening of world
peace."15
The obvious conclusion is that the American Constitution is
less concerned with responsibility than are the fundamental docu-
ments of other nations. The obvious conclusion, however, is wrong.
One should not expect our Constitution of 1787 to speak openly of
citizen responsibilities, even of responsibilities that are more consis-
tent with Western liberal traditions than some of the more extrava-
gant obligations described in European or Communist
constitutions. The American charter is a constitution of government
rather than a constitution of society-unlike some of its twentieth-
century foreign counterparts which self-consciously seek to define
6 Id. art. 53. See also id. art. 52 (duty to defend the country); id. art. 54 (duty of
fealty).
7 CONSTrrUCION, tit. I, ch. 2, § 2 (Spain), translated in CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COUN-
TRIES OF THE WORLD 49 (Albert P. Blaustein & Gisbert H. Flanz eds. & Gisbert H. Fanz
trans., 1991).
8 Id. art. 35.
9 Id. art. 39.
10 Id. art. 45. See also id. art. 30 (duty to defend the country); id art. 31 (duty to
contribute to public expenditures according to economic capacity).
11 KONSTrrrUTSUA SSSR art. 59 (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics), translated in
THE CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COMMUNIST WORLD 352-68 (F.MJ. Feldbrugge & William
B. Simons trans., 1977).
12 Id. art. 61.
13 Id. art. 65.
14 Id. art. 67.
15 Id. art. 69. See also id. art. 59 (duty to uphold law and comply with standards of
socialist conduct); id. art. 60 (duty to work); id. art. 62 (duty to defend the State); id. art
63 (duty to serve in the military); id. art 64 (duty to respect the national dignity of other
citizens); id. art. 65 (duty to help maintain public order); id. art. 66 (reciprocal duties of
parents and children); id. art. 68 (duty to preserve historical monuments and cultural
values).
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the entire social fabric. 16 But precisely for this reason, one should
not mistake silence for disregard.
The Framers made no such mistake. While they sought to
structure the federal government to avoid reliance on the good mo-
tives of either the citizens or the governors,' 7 the Framers recog-
nized that their constitutional order presupposes concepts of
responsibility. George Washington eloquently expressed these sen-
timents in his farewell address in 1796, in words that still have
power even for those who do not share his view of the connection
between morality and religion:
Of all the dispositions and habits, which lead to political pros-
perity, Religion and Morality are indispensable supports. In vain
would that man claim the tribute of Patriotism, who should labor
to subvert these great pillars of human happiness, these firmest
props of the duties of Men and Citizens. The mere politician,
equally with the pious man, ought to respect and to cherish them.
A volume could not trace all their connexions with private and
public felicity. Let it simply be asked, Where is the security for
property, for reputation, for life, if the sense of religious obliga-
tion desert the oaths, which are the instruments of investigation in
Courts ofjustice? ...
It is substantially true, that virtue or morality is a necessary
spring of popular government. The rule, indeed, extends with
more or less force to every species of free government. Who, that
is a sincere friend to it, can look with indifference upon attempts
to shake the foundation of the fabric?' 8
The fact that these moral values did not find expression in the fed-
eral Constitution does not detract from their imortance. Without a
general cultural insistence on a sense of personal honor-and, more
importantly, on a sense of shame-any form of social organization is
doomed. This obviously does not mean that one should charge the
federal government, or government at any level, with fostering a so-
cial ethic of individual responsibility; private institutions like fami-
lies and churches are surely the appropriate conveyors of social
values. Much less does it mean that the content of individual obliga-
tions should follow the Italian, Spanish, or Soviet models. But one
at least would hope that the government, through the legal system,
16 The preamble to the 1977 Soviet Constitution declares that the document's pur-
pose is to "affirm the foundations of the social system and the policies of the USSR,
establish the rights, freedoms, and obligations of citizens, and the principles of organiza-
tion and the aims of the socialist all-people's state, and proclaim them in this Constitu-
tion." Id. pmbl. Modem European constitutions are a bit subtler, but on the whole
follow that path to a much greater extent than does our own Constitution.
17 See THE FEDERALIST Nos. 10 & 51 (James Madison).
18 George Washington, Farewell Address, in DocUMErs OF AMERICAN HISTORY,
vol. I, 173 (Henry S. Commager & Milton Cantor eds., 10th ed. 1988).
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would not actively undermine the fundamental sense of individual
responsibility that is the necessary precondition for a civilized legal
order.
We suspect, however, that the modem American legal system
has become, and is becoming, increasingly hostile to the idea of in-
dividual responsibility in a wide variety of private and public law
contexts. The possible causes of such a movement are many: un-
due focus on the federal Constitution as the foundation for public
life; relativism and nihilism, especially among the intellectual
classes; and the fascination of intellectuals with socialism, which
supports a view of law as a device for central planning rather than
law as a tool for facilitating coordination. This Conference will test
our suspicions against a broad range of legal topics. If we are right
about the extent and consequences of the erosion of individual re-
sponsibility in the law, identification of the problem is the necessary
first step towards rescuing the concept of individual responsibility
implicit in the Founders' legal and constitutional order.
958
"A DEPENDENCE ON THE PEOPLE"
Senator Orrin G. Hatcht
This society has chosen a propitious moment to explore the link
between individual responsibility and the law. In the last month, we
all witnessed world-historic events in what-we can thankfully say--
used to be known as the Soviet Union. As that empire dissolves and
formerly captive peoples grapple with the monumental task of es-
tablishing limited government amid the human, spiritual, economic,
and environmental wreckage left by seven decades of totalitarian
rule, there will be some in this country eager to offer their advice-
solicited or otherwise-about constitution-making. Before offering
such advice, it behooves us to first reflect on the first principles of
limited government. It seems to me that individual responsibility is
not only a first principle of limited government, it is the first princi-
ple of limited government.
The Framers of the American Constitution had no illusions
about human nature. Because the experience of man taught-and I
should add, still teaches-that to concentrate governmental power
is to invite tyranny, the Framers divided power horizontally among a
unitary executive, an independent judiciary, and a bicameral legisla-
ture, and vertically between the national government and the states
in the form of federalism.
Americans are justly proud of their Constitution and its two
centuries of continuous operation. Too often we fail to remember,
however, that the Framers did not consider the Constitution to be
the primary guarantor of our liberties. Publius, in the 51 st Federalist,
characterized the architectural features of the Constitution as "aux-
iliary precautions"' for the preservation of liberty.
If the authors of the The Federalist Papers saw the Constitution
itself consisting of mere "auxiliary precautions," what then did they
consider the principal guarantor of liberty and limited government?
Publius answers in the 51st Federalist that "[A] dependence on the
t United States Senator (R-Utah), 1977-Present. B.A. Brigham Young University,
1959, LL.B. University of Pittsburgh School of Law, 1962. The author is widely re-
garded as one of the Senate's leading experts on constitutional matters as well as an
ardent defender of free-enterprise. He is a member of the Senate Judiciary Committee,
the Labor and Human Resources Committee, the Finance Committee, and is a Trustee
of the Federalist Society.
1 THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 322 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
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people is, no doubt, the primary control on the government." 2 In
the 55th Federalist, Publius somewhat offhandedly explains limited
government's "dependence on the people" even as human nature
counsels against dependence on self-restraint by the rulers:
As there is a degree of depravity in mankind which requires a cer-
tain degree of circumspection and distrust, so there are other
qualities in human nature which justify a certain portion of esteem
and confidence. Republican government presupposes the existence of these
qualities in a higher degree than any other form.3
The Federalist Papers contain few, if any, other references to this
"dependence on the people" for the "primary control" of the gov-
ernment. Apparently the sine qua non of a virtuous citizenry for lim-
ited government was so self-evident that there was no need for
further discussion of the proposition. Whatever their disagree-
ments with Publius about constitutional architecture, the Anti-Fed-
eralists would have agreed with Publius that the whole undertaking
was futile if the people themselves were not fitted for self-
government.
Thus, as Professor Forrest McDonald has observed, the Fram-
ers were guided by the principle that "the extent to which limited
government is feasible is determined by the extent to which the peo-
ple, socially and individually, can govern themselves."' 4 Professor
McDonald puts that more simply for the sake of emphasis: "If citi-
zens can behave themselves and make do for themselves, they need
little government; if they cannot, they need a great deal of
government." 5
What qualities of character in the people did the Framers pre-
suppose? Founding-era documents give us a very clear picture.
The Virginia Bill of Rights, drafted by George Mason and adopted
in 1776, provided that "[N]o free government, or the blessings of
liberty, can be preserved to any people, but by a firm adherence to
justice, moderation, temperance, frugality and virtue, and by fre-
quent recurrence to fundamental principles."' 6 Similarly, the Massa-
chusetts Bill of Rights of 1780 drafted by John Adams declared that
"[A] constant adherence to ... piety, justice, moderation, temper-
2 Id.
3 THE FEDERALIST No. 55, at 346 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)
(emphasis added).
4 FORREST McDONALD & ELLEN MCDONALD, REQUIEM: VARIATIONS ON EIGHT-
EENTH-CENTuRY THEMES 10 (1988).
5 Id.
6 The Virginia Bill of Rights (June 12, 1776), in HENRY S. COMMAGER, DOCUMENTS
OF AMERICAN HISTORY 103, 104 (9th ed. 1973).
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ance, industry and frugality, are absolutely necessary to preserve the
advantages of liberty, and to maintain a free government."7
The Northwest Ordinance of 1787, which was adopted by the
Congress under the Articles of Confederation while the Constitu-
tional Convention was meeting in Philadelphia, prescribed the man-
ner states from the Northwest Territory were to be admitted into
the Union, and like the Declaration of Independence, the Constitu-
tion and the U.S. Code is still part of the "organic law" of the
United States. Article 3 of the Ordinance proclaimed that
"[R]eligion, morality, and knowledge [are necessary for] good gov-
ernment and the happiness of mankind."'8
In his farewell address in 1796, President George Washington
admonished his countrymen that:
Of all the dispositions and habits which lead to political prosper-
ity, religion and morality are indispensable supports. In vain would
that man claim the tribute of patriotism who should labor to sub-
vert these great pillars of human happiness-thesefirmest props of
the duties of men and citizens. The mere politician, equally with
the pious man, ought to respect and cherish them .... 9
When Alexis de Tocqueville toured America in the 1830s, he
found a citizenry that seemed mindful of Washington's farewell ad-
monition of four decades earlier. He observed that in America,
Everything in the moral field is certain and fixed, although the
world of politics seems given over to argument and experiment.
So the human spirit never sees an unlimited field before itself;
however bold it is, from time to time it feels that it must halt
before insurmountable barriers. Before innovating, it is forced to
accept certain primary assumptions and to submit its boldest con-
ceptions to certain formalities which retard and check it.
Up till now no one in the United States has dared to profess the
maxim that everything is allowed in the interests of society, an
impious maxim apparently invented in an age of freedom in order
to legitimize every future tyrant. Thus, while the law allows the
American people to do everything, there are things which religion
prevents them from imagining and forbids them to dare. Reli-
gion, which never intervenes directly in the government of Ameri-
can society, should therefore be considered as the first of their
political institutions, for although it did not give them the taste for
liberty, it singularly facilitates their use thereof.10
7 The Massachusetts Bill of Rights (1780), in COMMAGER, supra note 6, at 107, 109.
8 Id. at 131.
9 GEORGE WASHINGTON: A COLLECTION 521 (W. Allen ed. 1988).
10 ALEXIS DE TOCOUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 269 (Mayer ed. 1966) (empha-
sis added).
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After touring America and observing its citizens and institu-
tions, de Tocqueville concluded that what made America a singu-
larly stable and prosperous country was not its geographical
advantages, nor the particular structures of its government and
laws, but rather the character of its people, which he attributed to
their mores:
I am convinced that the luckiest of geographical circumstances
and the best of laws cannot maintain a constitution in despite of
mores, whereas the latter can turn even the most unfavorable cir-
cumstances and the worst laws to advantage. The importance of
mores is a universal truth to which study and experience continu-
ally bring us back.
If in the course of this book I have not succeeded in making the
reader feel the importance I attach to the practical experience of
the Americans, to their habits, opinions, and, in a word, their mo-
res, in maintaining their laws, I have failed in the main object of
my work. "
In his discussion of the importance of the mores of the people
in a free government, de Tocqueville asked a question that is rele-
vant to us today: "How [can] society escape destruction if, when
political ties are relaxed, moral ties are not tightened?"' 12 Professor
Harry Jaffa answers that rhetorical question this way: "A free, self-
governing society, more than any other kind, depends upon the
qualities-the virtues-of its citizens. * * * In a Republic, the sobri-
ety of the citizens replaces the force of authority as the principal
source of order."' 13
Over the last three decades or so in this country, we have seen a
considerable relaxation of the societal moral constraints formerly
imposed on individual conduct. As these moral constraints have re-
laxed, we have seen an explosion of social pathologies, which in turn
has driven an expansion of government to respond to these
pathologies, proving Professor McDonald's dictum that individuals
who are unable to govern themselves need a great deal of
government.
Take one but very important example: the family. The leading
social problem in this country today is the breakdown of the Ameri-
can family. Put more precisely, it is the failure of families to form.
In 1989, the latest year for which statistics are available, one out of
11 Id. at 283-84.
12 Id. at 71.
13 HARRYJAFFA, AMERICAN CONSERVATISM AND THE AMERICAN FOUNDING 34 (1984).
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four children born in this country were born out of wedlock.14 A
substantial portion of these children will never be supported by
their fathers, but instead, will be supported by the government.
This fall, the Supreme Court will hear argument in a case that
presents the question of whether a State violates the federal Consti-
tution by permitting a rabbi to give an invocation during a school
commencement ceremony. 15 I would suggest to you George Wash-
ington would be astounded that under the same Constitution that
he swore to preserve, protect, and defend, such a practice would be
deemed to require adjudication by the highest court in the land, at a
time when many school districts routinely dispense contraceptives
to high school and even junior high students, and others teach AIDS
prevention to preschoolers.
In closing, whether we choose to offer our advice to those
abroad about the best way to establish limited government, we, as
individual citizens, would do well to try to re-establish limited gov-
ernment at home by heeding the lines of the second stanza of
America the Beautiful, which in their simple way capture the essence of
George Washington's farewell address:
America, America
God mend thine every flaw
Confirm thy soul in self-control
Thy liberty in law.
14 National Ctr. for Health Statistics, U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Serv., Advance
Report of Final Natality Statistics, 1989, 40 Monthly Vital Statistics Report No. 8(5),
published Dec. 12, 1991, at 1, 8.
15 Weisman v. Lee, 908 F.2d 1090 (1st Cir. 1990), cert. granted, Lee v. Weisman, 111
S. Ct. 1305 (1991).
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PANEL I
ENTITLEMENTS, EMPOWERMENT, AND
VICTIMIZATION
Win. Bradford Reynoldst
INTRODUCTION
When I was asked to participate on this panel, I could not help
but reflect back almost ten years to the fall of 1981 when I became a
rather noticeable player on the debate circuit. The debate then was
much narrower and indeed much more one-sided. Entitlements was
the topic, but back then the tag was "affirmative action"-whether
you are for it or against it. At that time the phrase had sufficient
respectability. Associated with terms such as goals, quotas, prefer-
ences, and set asides, the phrase was used without any embarrass-
ment whatsoever.
What a difference a decade makes. The debate over race- and
gender-based preferential treatment has been joined, and joined
very energetically. Affirmative action programs, once seemingly
well entrenched, came under increased scrutiny. Goals, quotas, set-
asides, preferences-the stock in trade of the civil rights agenda
throughout the '70s and into the '80s-started losing their luster.
This shift in attitude toward affirmative action extended beyond
political circles, as the '80s progressed, into the courts as well. Seri-
ous questions emerged, and continue to emerge, about some of the
past civil rights policies and where, if anywhere, they were destined
to lead.
This panel discussion is a logical outgrowth of the past decade's
questioning of the evolving precepts-questioning that became a
very real part of the civil rights orthodoxy of the past. It is not about
the extent of racism or discrimination in society today. All of us on
the panel believe this country has a long way to go to remove the
t Partner, Dickstein, Shapiro & Morin, Washington, D.C. A.B., Yale University;
J.D., Vanderbilt Law School. The author served as Assistant Attorney General for the
Civil Rights Division from 1981 through 1988, and as Counselor to the Attorney Gen-
eral of the United States from 1987 through 1988. Before his government service, he
was a partner at Shaw, Pittman, Potts & Trowbridge and served as an Assistant to the
Solicitor General from 1970 to 1973. He was a Distinguished Fellow in Law and Public
Affairs at the National Legal Center for the Public Interest from 1989 through 1990, and
is currently a Distinguished Scholar in Law and Democracy at the Free Congress Foun-
dation and a Trustee of the Federalist Society.
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blight of discrimination on a variety of fronts: race, gender, religion,
national origin, disability. I expect as well that the members of the
panel share with me the rather disquieting feeling that a polariza-
tion-indeed we hear it said in some quarters, a balkanization-of
the races is becoming more evident. So this is not a debate on
whether racism or discrimination is prevalent today. It is also not an
exchange of views about affirmative action, per se, although that
clearly will be one aspect of the discussion. Instead, the dialogue
this afternoon is really going to center largely on what makes sense
for the future.
The traditional civil rights focus views preferential treatment
(i.e., entitlements) as still alive, if not terribly well. The Supreme
Court has thrown "affirmative action" a remedial lifeline-once all
alternative race- or gender-neutral remedies have been tried and
failed so long as the preferential remedial program is narrowly tai-
lored and of limited duration.
Proponents of such programs defend them by saying "it is the
least that we can do to chip away at years of systemic discrimina-
tion." Those opposed to preferential affirmative action retort that
"such programs serve only to perpetuate the divisiveness of discrim-
ination and to debase the accomplishments of the racially preferred;
they do nothing to treat the real societal problems that are continu-
ing to tear at the fabric of many American communities."
If you sense in that debate the body language of victimization,
stay with us, because in a very real sense, victimization is a central
theme here. It has a number of overlays. Those minority families-
overwhelmingly, I would suggest to you, the middle-class families-
who have actually been touched by affirmative action programs,
have a victimization story to tell. That story goes hand-in-hand with
being identified, often erroneously, as the affirmative action student,
employee, promotee, government official, or even Supreme Court
nominee.
They who are among the nation's most impoverished, who have
been identified as lower class in the economic sense, and who have
never been touched by affirmative action programs-and this is by
far the overwhelming majority of this country's minority popula-
tion-also have a victimization story to tell. The more of those sto-
ries that emerge from policies that promote the concept of
preference, the more they are told. The more they are told, the
more debilitated the prospects for any meaningful change become.
If you repeatedly tell a group of people enough times that its mem-
bership is composed of society's victims, eventually the stigma of
inferiority settles in. The members begin to believe, even if only
intuitively, that they are second class citizens for whom preferences
1992] 965
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are the only means of achieving equality. In this regard, the social
welfare mentality that swept across this country in the '60s and '70s,
and lingers still today, helps, in some respects, to explain the persis-
tence among those still pushing for entitlements.
On the other hand, a new policy shift is clearly emerging-one
that currently travels under the banner of empowerments and that is
grounded in the work ethic, in self-help programs, in economic self-
sufficiency, in freedom from governmental intervention, in commu-
nity cooperation, and in educational choice. Empowerment pro-
grams are not being promoted as the wholesale solution to the
problems that confront so many communities across the land. The
fight against discrimination in law enforcement is still an essential
piece of the puzzle. The effort to reach out affirmatively to those
competitively qualified is another important piece of the puzzle. But
the empowerment philosophy brings to the table a new and exciting
set of policy considerations that may well hold the greatest promise
we have yet seen for a meaningful equal opportunity agenda.
POVERTY: A COLLECTIVE DIFFICULTY,
A COLLECTIVE CHALLENGE
Randall L. Kennedyt
I would like to thank The Federalist Society for the opportunity
to share some ideas. My premises are as follows. Our society is be-
set by major problems. The most urgent of these problems is pov-
erty. This problem is a collective difficulty. It is not simply the
problem of people in Southeast Washington, D.C., or South Central
Los Angeles, or Roxbury, Massachusetts. It is our problem, a collec-
tive challenge-just like war constitutes a collective challenge. The
poverty that envelopes so many of our fellow Americans should
cause us pain. Moreover, apart from causing us moral pain, poverty
should also give rise to alarm because the evils that typically accom-
pany severe deprivation-crime, ignorance, resentment, etc.-pose
a threat to us all. Another of my premises is that, with respect to
what I have said thus far, there will be wide (though not total) agree-
ment on this panel and within this audience.
Now for disagreement. Dr. Keyes makes the all too fashionable
assertion that government intervention aimed at addressing poverty
and its attendant problems is more harmful than helpful. He offers
no evidence to substantiate his claim. Rather, falling victim to a ten-
dency that besets many who feel that they are speaking to the con-
verted, he simply announces conclusions. The fact of the matter is,
however, that many thousands-many hundreds of thousands-of
people have had their lives significantly bettered by the intervention
of government assistance, especially assistance from thefederal gov-
ernment. I speak particularly of interventions focused upon the eld-
erly. In 1960, prior to the creation of the much maligned Great
Society programs, one in every three persons over the age of 65 was
impoverished. That poverty rate declined to one in four in 1970
and one in eight by 1987. Much of this progress is attributable to
government intervention.'
Dr. Keyes maintains that government must always attend to the
basic humanity of the governed, that it ought never act in a way that
diminishes individuals' capacities to use freedom enjoyably and pro-
ductively. I, of course, agree with all of that; government programs
t Professor of Law, Harvard University. J.D. Yale Law School, 1982.
1 THEODORE R. MARMOR ET AL., AMERICA'S MISUNDERSTOOD WELFARE STATE: PER-
sis'ENT MYTHS, ENDURING REALITIES passim (1990).
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that have such consequences ought to be abolished (except, of
course, if doing so would lead to even worse results such as death by
starvation). What I would like for Dr. Keyes to do, however, is iden-
tify with particularity the programs that impose the harms about
which he speaks. That would be far more useful than the overgener-
alized condemnations that he has articulated thus far. Moreover,
Dr. Keyes should go beyond merely recognizing that government
programs, created with the best of intentions, can (not must but can)
enslave people. He should also recognize that poverty, too, can en-
slave people. As that great American president Franklin D.
Roosevelt declared: "Necessitous men are not free men." 2
2 Franklin D. Roosevelt, Message to Congress, Jan. 11, 1944, cited in E. CORWIN,
LIBERTY AGAINST GOVERNMENT 4 (1948).
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THE PRESERVATION OF LIBERTY
Alan Keyest
My introductory remarks in this discussion begin with reference
to natural law and Madison's famous phrase in The Federalist Papers;
my initial point being that "Ujustice is the end of government [and]
the end of civil society. It has been and ever will be pursued until it
[is] obtained or until liberty be lost in the pursuit."' Throughout
my career dealing with public policy I have often recalled this phrase
because it aptly summarizes the challenge our society faces when
confronted with questions involving principles of right and justice.
This challenge requires us to understand that though justice, as a
goal, has a substantive relevance to any regime, in our regime it is
related to, and possibly may threaten, the "real" motivating goal of
society's existence: the preservation of liberty.
In our society, liberty is understood to be a part ofjustice. It is
the first, and perhaps most, fundamental entitlement of our political
structure. As we discuss questions ofjustice, liberty becomes a kind
of limiting concept that we must always be mindful of as we progress
further down the road-especially in discussions of distributive jus-
tice-and are reminded that, for us, justice has not only a distribu-
tive, but also a substantive meaning. You cannot do justice without
a respect for the essential dignity of the human beings with whom
you deal. Understanding this concept, however, requires recon-
ciling the pursuit of justice with the perpetuation of self-govern-
ment. Obviously one can imagine a regime in which one or several
all wise beings order things in a way that everyone gets what they
deserve-a regime whose only requirement in return would be that
all the individuals surrender their capacity and opportunity to make
decisions, even bad ones, for themselves. I have always assumed
that if someone offered me that bargain, I would reject it because I
would rather make bad decisions and suffer the consequences than
be enslaved to good masters-the goodness of mastery never being
the question for me, but rather its existence and implication for my
person of slavery.
I go through this illustration because it is the best way to re-
mind us about the limits we, as citizens of a regime concerned with
freedom and self-government, should place on our more abstract
t Alan Keyes is a candidate for U.S. Senator from Maryland.
I THE FEDERALIST No. 51 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
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discussion. We are not simply concerned with how well individuals
may fare in the distribution of society's goods, resources, services,
opportunities, and so forth. For us there must be, along with those
kinds of concerns which can exist in any regime, a profound and
fundamental concern for the maintenance of freedom and self-gov-
ernment-two peculiar and particular characteristics of this regime.
This is very important because it settles a lot of issues (or at
least provides a clue as to how to deal with them) that we discuss at
great length in this society. It means that no matter how much good
we may wish to achieve, we do not have the right to achieve that'
good at the expense of others' freedom.
When I use the word freedom, I do not mean it in the licentious
sense of people out there doing whatever they please. Rather, I use
freedom in the sense of creating, preparing, and maintaining a soci-
ety in which individuals capable of freedom can develop that capac-
ity and exercise it in a way which is consonant with the perpetuation
of the society's existence. Freedom has direct implications for all
kinds of entitlement programs and I will just talk about a couple as
examples.
We understand liberty to be an entitlement, but only with refer-
ence to some principle which transcends human choice, government
fiat, and even the Constitution. Despite contrary belief, the Consti-
tution is positive law, and the founders of our regime quite clearly
indicated to us that when positive law goes wrong, you have the
right to do various things, up to and including rebellion, in order to
rectify it. The founders never understood that Constitution with a
big "C" would ever be god. What they understood was that our
Creator, not the Constitution, endowed us with certain inalienable
rights and that those rights, those entitlements, transcend positive
law and positively established human governmental institutions.
You can refer to the source of the inalienable rights as whatever
you like. You can attribute their existence to whatever mystical
source you may wish to conjure up, but at the end of the day, the
form of words that you use to justify human entitlement to freedom
will always have some reference to natural law. Even the statement,
"you shouldn't treat human beings that way" is a reference to
human nature, to what accords with human nature, and to what ac-
cords with that mode of being which governs our human nature,
which you can refer to as a law. All of our common ways of speech
imply this way of thinking though we do not like to admit it. A lot of
people are too ignorant even to know that they are talking in this
language, but our founders determined us in such a way that we
cannot help but talk in this language.
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Talking in this language puts us in an odd position when think-
ing in terms of affirmative action. Those who are in favor of affirma-
tive action but against quotas have a sound basis for their position
because the one can be pursued with respect for the dignity of the
individuals that we are dealing with while the other cannot. Quotas
reduce individuals to an abstract statistic and takes no account of
their intrinsic worth or intrinsic capacity to take responsibility for
themselves. That is why desire to do good must be limited by an
understanding that any good which contravenes an individual's ca-
pacity to take personal responsibility is not good at all.
Quotas in fact do justice in a way that incurs the most profound
injustice, if I am a black person. Quotas set me in a position in life
without regard to my individual merit, worth, and qualities. You
will be able to achieve what you abstractly understand to be a so-
cially desirable goal or balance in society. But you have achieved
your understanding ofjustice at the expense of my individual worth.
And your desire to do good has stood the goals of the civil rights
movement on their head.
For some people this is hard to understand, particularly those
who have what I call the apartheid approach to affirmative action;
that is the group rights approach to affirmative action. It is not
widely known in our society that apartheid was not just a racist in-
stinct. It was actually a fairly well developed ideology at one point.
And that ideology was, and still is in the minds of its strongest pro-
ponents, based on the idea that rights inhere not in individuals but
in groups of people. Blacks have rights as blacks; Indians have
rights as indians; Whites have rights as whites; Women have rights
as women. We figure out what they are, delineate them according to
some sort of system, and everybody gets their due, based upon be-
longing to that group or class.
This is all well and good if you are going to impose an external
understanding of justice on every individual and distribute goods in
society according to that external understanding. But such an impo-
sition eradicates the existence of the individual's worth and in doing
so you have done what all tyrannies do: you have treated human
beings as if they are mere instruments of societal and governmental
power in the pursuit of some good. Now if you are a real tyrant, that
good is going to be your own narrow little good; the good that is
defined by your appetites. If you are a more benign ideological ty-
rant, then the good will be defined in a more abstract way. But you
will still treat human beings instrumentally, violating not only what
we understand, but even what such abstract thinkers as Kant under-
stood to be one of the prerequisites for decent human relations:
that you must never treat human beings as if they were simply in-
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struments to your ends. Unhappily, the statistical understanding of
affirmative action treats human beings precisely in this way.
Sadly speaking, some of the other well-motivated, but mis-
guided approaches to dealing with human problems in our society
do the same thing. In fact, this same mentality is at the heart of a
very common approach to welfare-to dealing with what we view as
the problems of poverty, economic advancement, and development
in this society. Look at the statistics. We have a lot of poor people.
We feel compelled to find some way to rectify that poverty through
the manipulation of external things, such as the flow of money. We
do not, however, take account of the impact that our action will have
on the internal, intrinsic, and subjective situation of the individuals
we deal with. We treat them as if they were numbers-classed ac-
cording to income or lack of income. In doing so, once again we
treat human beings as if they were instruments, not ends. Admit-
tedly, their internal worth is sacrificed as a misguided means to
achieving a noble purpose; that of producing a just society. But
even if it means waiting a little longer for that kind of a just society,
it is important to understand that human beings have an internal
worth which must be respected as we go about our purposes.
For this reason, the empowerment philosophy, as it is called, is
a necessary alternative in our society to the more abstract pursuits
of justice that, until recently, were common. Empowerment by its
very nature requires that we ask ourselves about the human being's
capacity to do for him or herself and that we understand each of our
actions have a relation to the development of that capacity. If we
simply rectify an injustice in an external sense but do not develop
that capacity, then we have done the individual wrong. To avoid
this wrong, we must examine every program and we must especially
examine everything we do with respect to a simple question: What
does it do to the individual's sense of responsibility?
Empowerment does not mean just the capacity to do for one-
self; rather it means the motive and the will to take the responsibility
for one's own destiny. This is the essence of self-government. That
which promotes this will is good. That which destroys it, however
laudable the results might be, is bad. It is better to have a poor
person who is capable of freedom than to have a person not poor
whose soul has been bereft of that capacity. Systems that destroy
this will in the name of justice, even if they produce good results,
have in the name of distributive justice bred passivity, dependency,
a lack of motivation, and a sense that someone else was responsible
for one's conditions. Such a system, regardless of its results, is in-
trinsically unjust. That is where the issue has to be engaged in prin-
ciple. I am not arguing with people, though I could, over whether
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or not certain approaches produce more or less poverty. That is
not, in this case, the only question. I am arguing about whether
certain approaches to producing more or less poverty, produce
more or less capable individuals in terms of their capacity for
freedom.
That leads me to a final point which, in light of the discussion I
have tried to present, would lead one to redefine victimization. I
know that we often understand victimization to mean that I make a
victim of you on account of my negative and nasty passions, hatred,
resentment, prejudice, or racism. That in pursuit of those passions,
I victimize you, take your life, deprive you of some good, deny you
opportunities and advancement in society. This definition is helpful
when we look at individuals and try to rectify the injustices done to
them.
At the same time, however, when we look at groups within soci-
ety, victimization takes on another meaning. It means defining a
whole class of people as victims, treating them with remedies that, in
the name of improving their situation, lead this class of people to
understand themselves as victims. This kind of victimization,
though it serves the purposes of sociologists and social engineers,
constitutes a fundamental act of injustice. If we define individuals as
victims and then treat them with remedies that perpetuate this self-
concept, we deprive them of the most important motive for securing
their freedom as individuals: the sense that they are responsible for
and to themselves. Without this feeling, the peasant never revolts,
the slave never lifts his eyes to look upon the brutality of the master,
and the oppressed never strike a blow toward liberation. Frederick
Douglas once said that those who would be free themselves must
strike the blow. If we take away the will that lifts the arm which
strikes the blow for freedom, we have destroyed the free citizen's
most important good.
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BLAMING THE VICTIM: A CRITIQUE OF
ATTACKS ON AFFIRMATIVE ACTION
Nadine Strossent
Randy Kennedy helped focus the discussion when he said that
on the level of principles we all agree, but we disagree about the
means for pursuing those principles. Without being disparaging, I
would say that we all agree on the level of platitude. First, we are all
in favor of individual liberty. Second, we abhor racism and poverty
as disproportionately impeding certain segments of our society from
enjoying the benefits of liberty. We disagree, though, on what rem-
edies will effectively foster our shared goals of promoting liberty on
an equal basis.
Dr. Keyes stressed the fact that we have rights as individuals
rather than as members of groups. That is certainly true. An
equally true fact, though, is that, throughout our history, people
have been denied liberty disproportionately, and to this day are be-
ing denied liberty disproportionately, based on their membership in
particular groups. In the same vein, I completely agree with Dr.
Keyes that people should be treated not as numbers but as individu-
als. However, it is irresponsible for us to ignore the shockingly dis-
proportionate extent to which the liberty of people who belong to
certain groups is violated.
Bearing in mind the useful general focus that Randy provided, I
would like to narrow the focus even further. I would like to concen-
trate on one particular critique that Dr. Keyes made, and that I have
heard in similar gatherings, about one particular means for address-
ing the ongoing crisis in this society's maldistribution of liberty on
the basis of race. I am referring to affirmative action.
In his opening remarks, Brad Reynolds talked about the "good
old days" when people were not embarrassed to talk about affirma-
tive action. Well, I stand here before you and say I still am not em-
barrassed to be an advocate of affirmative action. Brad also referred
to a civil rights orthodoxy. Perhaps he and many of you see affirma-
tive action as an outmoded part of this orthodoxy that should now
be rejected. I agree that we should not simplistically look upon one
t Professor of Law, New York Law School; President, American Civil Liberties
Union. A.B. Harvard-Radcliffe College, 1972;J.D. Harvard Law School, 1975. The au-
thor thanks the following individuals for their research assistance: Marie Costello, Eliza-
beth Dowell, Caroline Gargione and Catherine Siemann.
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particular remedy as a panacea. This is particularly true when the
remedies encompassed by the term "affirmative action" include a
wide panoply of measures, some of which may be more appropriate
than others. Still, I do not think it is appropriate, in a knee-jerk
fashion, to reject the entire concept of affirmative action.
Just as Brad Reynolds cautions against what he views as outmo-
ded orthodoxies, so too, I think we also must guard against ques-
tionable new orthodoxies. A term that seems fashionable in these
circles describes another remedy that should not be viewed as a pan-
acea: the notion of "self-help." As I listened to Dr. Keyes invoke
that seemingly magic buzzword, I was reminded of a statement that
Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. made many years ago. He said it is a
cruel hoax to tell a man he should lift himself up by his bootstraps
when he has no boots. So, just as affirmative action may not be a
panacea, let us not overestimate the efficacy of alternative measures
such as self-help.
The specific critique of affirmative action on which I would like
to focus is the idea of victimization. I see it as a sort of blame-the-
victim phenomenon. The argument is that the intended benefi-
ciaries of affirmative action programs are really stigmatized by these
programs. Dr. Keyes made the argument that they are diminished,
they are disempowered, they are made to feel their inferiority. I
echo Randy Kennedy's request for evidence to demonstrate this
supposed phenomenon. It is asserted as though it were a self-un-
derstood truth, and yet I am unaware of any empirical studies that
prove this is, in fact, a psychological impact of affirmative action
programs.
Like Randy, I too looked into the empirical evidence. During
my search, I came across an interesting article in Law & Policy by a
psychologist named Rupert Barnes Nacoste, who analyzed the stud-
ies that had been done on the psychological impacts of affirmative
action.' He was responding to what he perceived as widely stated
but never empirically demonstrated conclusions that beneficiaries of
affirmative action programs experience self-doubt, that non-benefi-
ciaries experience resentment, and consequently, that these pro-
grams cause an increase in interracial tensions. The evidence did
not support conclusions that these adverse psychological effects are
the inevitable consequences of affirmative action programs.2
Rather, the evidence strongly suggests that psychological responses
are contingent on the accuracy or inaccuracy of the information and
I Rubert Barnes Nacoste, Sources of Stigma: Analyzing the Psychology of Affirmative Ac-
tion, 12 LAw & POL'Y 175 (1990).
2 Id. at 190.
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the understanding that a person has about affirmative action.3 This
does not strike me as surprising.
Dr. Nacoste concluded that people's psychological reactions to
affirmative action depend in particular on two variables. 4 The first
factor is the nature of the specific program involved.5 One of the
problems with the current public discussion of this subject is that it
often does not address the many reasonable, well-conceived, and
fairly implemented programs in effect all over the county. Instead,
the term "affirmative action" is often used in a sweeping, condem-
natory way, and discussions will often focus on particular ill-advised
or bizarre examples that masquerade under that term.
In this respect, the phrase "affirmative action" reminds me of
another current buzzword about which Professor Kennedy and I
have previously debated-"political correctness." That term has
taken on a pejorative meaning because too often it is associated with
a few extreme and exaggerated applications of policies that, at bot-
tom, reflect some positive impulse toward important, laudable goals
of diversity and equality. The same thing has happened with respect
to affirmative action. The surveys to which Dr. Nacoste referred
showed that most people, if they associated affirmative action with
quotas, opposed it.6 Unfortunately, recent political discussion has
tended to equate affirmative action with quotas. In fact, in the re-
cent political discourse about affirmative action, it is not only the
people who are allegedly benefited by these programs who are said
to be stigmatized but, even worse, the whole notion itself has be-
come stigmatized in a way that obscures meaningful analysis and
debate.
According to Dr. Nacoste, the other variable factor that affects
the perception of affirmative action, and whether or not it has nega-
tive psychological consequences for the intended beneficiaries and
the rest of society, is how well people understand and accept the
underlying rationale. 7 In particular, he found that beneficiaries did
not feel stigmatized and non-beneficiaries felt more positive when
they understood that the target group was in fact needy and that it
was receiving just compensation for actual past harm.8
Dr. Nacoste also found that statements by top political leaders
had a profound influence on how people perceived these pro-
grams. 9 So, not surprisingly, certain political leaders who have re-
3 Id. at 188.
4 Id. at 183.
5 Id.
6 Id. at 187.
7 Id. at 183.
8 Id. at 188.
9 Id. at 187.
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lentlessly associated "the Qword," "quota," with affirmative action
have played a major, unconstructive role in obscuring the debate
about the underlying merits of affirmative action. If people truly
understood the actual facts about the disproportionate denial of lib-
erty on the basis of race throughout our history to this day, neither
the intended beneficiaries, nor the rest of society, could rationally
attach a stigma or a resentment to those programs.
This morning I re-read the brief that the American Civil Liber-
ties Union filed in the Bakke case, 10 and I was struck by how timely
many of those statements, written in 1976, are today. I find that
very sad. The ACLU supported the affirmative action program that
the University of California at Davis had adopted in that case, on the
rationale that the program promotes the individual equality neces-
sary to the enjoyment of individual liberty. I would like to read part
of the introduction to that brief:
[T]he major civil liberties issue still facing the United States is the
elimination, root and branch, of all vestiges of racism. No other
asserted claim of right surpasses the wholly justified demand of
the nation's discrete and insular minorities for access to the Amer-
ican mainstream from which they have so long been excluded."
I read the foregoing passage because I know some people in Feder-
alist Society circles see a disparity or tension between the values of
liberty and those of equality. I believe, though, that both sets of
constitutional values are inextricably intertwined for the reason ex-
plained in the quoted passage.
Consistent with the foregoing statement in the ACLU's Bakke
brief, Justice Blackmun's powerful dissenting opinion in that case
said that, given the then current state of deprivation of rights and
liberties on the basis of race in our society, affirmative action meas-
ures were justified in terms of fundamental social justice.12 Hoping
that racial injustice would mark only a passing phase in our social
history, Justice Blackmun expressed the view that affirmative action
measures should be only temporary.13 He voiced the hope that
these measures would help us to attain a state of equality of oppor-
tunity that is not maldistributed on the basis of race.14
Justice Blackmun speculated in Bakke, back in 1976, that a dec-
ade might be the limited period during which affirmative action
10 Brief of the American Civil Liberties Union, The ACLU of Northern California,
The ACLU of Southern California, Amid Curiae, Regents of the Uni. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438
U.S. 265 (No. 76-811) (1978).
11 Id. at2.
12 Regents of the Uni. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265,403 (1978) (BlackmunJustice,
dissenting).
13 Id. at 403.
14 Id.
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remedies would be necessary for meaningful progress toward racial
equality. 15 We have long since passed that ten-year mark. The cur-
rent year, 1991, is 15 years after Bakke was decided and, unfortu-
nately, we have not substantially progressed toward racial equality.
Justice Blackmun would probably acknowledge this fact, and the
ACLU certainly does.
Along with other ACLU leaders, I believe that the most perva-
sive, overarching civil liberties problem in this country continues to
be racial discrimination. Among all the victims of civil liberties vio-
lations that the ACLU represents, regarding a wide range of issues,
people of color are disproportionately included. Therefore, if af-
firmative action is a remedy that is only going to be necessary on a
temporary basis, we are still in that temporary phase.
In sum, there is a compelling social justice rationale for race-
based affirmative action programs. Why should they be seen as
more stigmatizing than other group-based programs? Indeed, we
have many group-based preferences that are not intended to be
compensatory and that do not have the compelling social justice ra-
tionale that affirmative action has. When I read the ACLU's brief in
the Bakke case this morning, I was reminded of two such
preferences.
Allen Bakke, the white medical student who sued the University
of California at Davis because he was denied the particular prefer-
ence that accrued to members of racial minorities, was also denied
two other group-based preferences that were meted out by the med-
ical school, neither of which he challenged. 16 One was a preference
for applicants who intended to practice medicine in northern Cali-
fornia following their graduation. 17 The other was a preference for
applicants whose spouses were enrolled in the medical school.' 8 It
is telling that Allen Bakke did not challenge those non-racial prefer-
ences. Too often, race-based affirmative action is singled out as the
only type of group-based preference in our society that should be
seen as connoting the beneficiary's inferiority, thus making the ben-
eficiary into a victim who bears a stigma.
There is a racist cast to this disparity in societal attitudes toward
different kinds of group-based preferences. Preferences designed to
help traditionally oppressed racial minorities are said to be stigma-
tizing, but nobody questions whether the many other group-based
preferences prevalent in our society are stigmatizing. Let me read
15 Id.
16 See supra note 10, at 5.
17 Id. at5.
18 Id.
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you a passage which forcefully makes this point. It is from a book by
Philip Green, written in 1981:
Do all those corporate directors, bankers, etc., who got their jobs,
first, because they were somebody's son, second, because they
were male, third, because they were Protestant, and fourth, be-
cause they were white feel demeaned thereby? It would be inter-
esting to ask them-and to ask the same question of the doctors
who managed to get into good medical schools because there
were quotas keeping outJews, the skilled tradesmen who were ad-
mitted to the union because two members of their family recom-
mended them and so on. Implicit in this critique of affirmative
action, clearly, is a notion that whereas it's never painful to be
rewarded because you are in the majority or the established elite,
it's always painful to be rewarded because you're in the minority
or a marginal group.' 9
Indeed, should those of us who are unintended but actual bene-
ficiaries of years of racial discrimination or gender discrimination in
this society feel stigmatized? Should we feel victimized because we
have, in fact, reaped the benefits of past discrimination?
Another argument that has been raised against affirmative ac-
tion, which is akin to the notion of stigmatization and victimization,
is the idea that it breeds passivity and leads to a lack of will. Dr.
Keyes made this point. Again, I am not aware of any psychological
studies that support this assertion. Indeed, some of the evidence
Professor Kennedy described seems to call that conclusion into
question.
It also seems a matter of common sense that a group of people
who know they are to be systematically denied certain opportunities
would become discouraged, and such discouragement would breed
a lack of will, a lack of motivation, a lack of incentive. Systematic
discrimination should be expected to breed passivity. A corre-
sponding inference is that the awareness of future opportunity
should be expected to bolster one's resolve and ability to help one-
self in meaningful ways.
In conclusion, if affirmative action is fairly understood as a mat-
ter of basic social justice, two other, important realizations should
follow: first, that there are no special, undeserving, victimized, stig-
matized beneficiaries, but that all of society is a beneficiary; and sec-
ond, that any stigma should attach to those who unfairly criticize
such a basic tool for pursuing social justice rather than to those who
benefit from the removal of traditional barriers to their full and
meaningful participation in this society.
19 PHILIP GREEN, THE PURSUIT OF INEQUALITY 186 (1981).
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REYNOLDS:
I, too, favor affirmative action, so long as the phrase is defined
in a way that eliminates the quota feature. It is the preferences and
the quotas that make affirmative action offensive and rebut a signifi-
cant portion of Nadine's analysis about the more general "affirma-
tive action" term. Affirmative action can mean all things to all
people. It seems that the primary stumbling block to meaningful
discussion occurs when someone suggests that Justice Blackmun in
his Bakke dissent got it right when he said we can use race to get
beyond racism.' It is this feature of affirmative action that seems to
run head first into all the other beneficial considerations that people
would like to think go along with an affirmative action program that
is not preferentially based.
With that as an observation, let us go back in the order that we
started; Dr. Keyes can have the first shot.
DR. KEYES:
The first place to begin might be by pointing out, that while the
founders said we hold certain truths to be self-evident, it took sev-
eral thousand years for those self-evident truths to be recognized by
anyone. Just because something is obvious does not mean that it is
going to be understood. Thus, even after society had recognized
the basic principles on which Americans agree, it did not protect the
individual from the fact that by and large in our practice of life, peo-
ple neglect those principles' existence, in both action and
discussion.
I am deeply gratified, therefore, to see that the speakers agree
that liberty should be understood as what Kant would call a limiting
analytic for our discussion of this kind of justice. If that does, in
fact, become the case, we should see some giant leaps forward in
social policy and in reasoning. I must confess that so far I am not
very impressed with the understanding of this concept that the sub-
sequent speakers displayed. That was in part because they re-
sponded to a speech they thought I had given rather than the one I
actually gave. My speech was less about self-help than about the
more important concept of self-government, which lies at the heart
of our understanding of liberty, and which therefore has a great deal
of relevance to our critique of programs that go beyond the simplis-
I Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 407 (1978) (Blackmun Justice,
dissenting) ("In order to get beyond racism, we must first take account of race.").
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tic question of how well or ill they work. Like Thomas Soul, Walter
Williams, Charles Marrier, and countless others, I too can engage in
the business of critiquing program results, but I have never pre-
tended to be an empirical scientist. I am more comfortable with
principles than with the interpretation of statistical results.
Sometimes those engaging in empiricism need to be guided in
the questions they ask. It is really surprising how often useful infor-
mation is overlooked simply because we are not looking for it.
Since, for example, we do not look for statistics on the degradation
of character for self-government, we did not find it. I would there-
fore recommend that, both as an academic and a practical pursuit,
we use devices similar to environmental impact statements for every
social policy decision. From now on, all social policy ought to be
accompanied by self-government impact statements which would ar-
ticulate a program's impact upon the character for self-government.
An illustration of this problem might be helpful. I would never
pretend that the denial of participation on the basis of race in our
society is not pervasive. I suspect that my father would have been
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff long before Colin Powell if
there had been proper respect for real capacity in this country that
was not governed by race. This observation notwithstanding, I am
unwilling to say that in order to remedy that denial of participation,
we must establish a system that will arbitrarily decide results.
Suppose, for example, that there is a great race which has been
run throughout history, such as the Olympics. Suppose further that
on the basis of race, black people have been systematically denied
the right to run in these Olympics for several decades. Since I am a
black person, I cannot run in this race. Then someone comes along
and says we are going to remedy the denial of past participation and
declare the race open. This is good; I am glad to join the race. But
this is not enough for my benefactors. They cannot just let me run.
They say that if I place sixth, that is the equivalent of winning the
race.
Some are satisfied that this scenario remedies past discrimina-
tion. But what it really does is establish a standard that will prevent
me from ever remedying the effects of past discrimination. The only
way the effects of my lack of access to the race can be remedied is if I
am forced to run the race, to run it hard, and to run it to the highest
standards, until my capacities develop in such a way that I place first
by my own right. Everyone is ignoring this impact, and that is what
I mean by the impact on victims.
While it would be nice to do psychological studies to see how
people feel about themselves, this misses the point. The point is
that if I am admitted to law school on a lower standard of scores,
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shepherded through law school with a lower standard of perform-
ance, and if I come out at the other end a product of this system,
how many firms in this country are going to tolerate a lower stan-
dard of results and promote me to partnership and give me perqui-
sites and privileges not commensurate with the clients I bring in and
represent? I will tell you how many-not a single one. That is a
problem. The effort to compensate past denials has produced a
remedy which perpetuates the incapacity created by those denials.
This is not justice; this is feel good social engineering. Society will
feel good because it looks as if injustice has been remedied, but I
and all blacks will remain the victims, not this time of the injustice,
but of society's misguided remedies for it.
Many people appreciate this because they think it is possible to
become a good runner by watching other people run. This is not
the case. There are some things in life you get good at only if you
do them and do them up to standard. Freedom is one of the most
important of them.
Professor Strossen used a phrase that I found interesting, yet a
little disturbing. It was the phrase, "the maldistribution of liberty."
In my speech, I distinguished between distributed justice, which re-
fers to things, and substantive justice, which refers to the qualities-
if that term is appropriate-of human beings. Liberty falls in the
category of quality, not in the category of goods to be distributed in
this way, because liberty is like a good running body-you can only
develop it by exercising. Liberty cannot be distributed. You cannot
hand me my liberty and say "Here, have some liberty, now go out
and enjoy." Liberty is an innate strength. It is not simply the op-
portunity for choice, nor is it simply the end result of choice. It is
the development of that strength, that capacity, that wisdom, that
common sense, that instinct, whatever it may be that allows one to
use choice in a way that perpetuates the ability to choose. In other
words, liberty is the use of freedom in a way that sustains it and that
produces good results for oneself, based upon one's own exercise of
it. This means you cannot distribute liberty. You can try to get out
of the way and let people develop it-but you cannot hand it out.
This misunderstanding has led to all kinds of awful domestic and
international projects where we think we can actually give people
their freedom. I am a great admirer of Abraham Lincoln, but Abra-
ham Lincoln did not emancipate black people in this country. Black
people, as most people who really look at history know, had to
struggle for many decades to emancipate themselves.
Both of the other speakers made a mistake that I believe is at
the heart of this whole dispute over social justice, at least with re-
spect to economic things. The problem is saying that poverty some-
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how equates with slavery, or is the same thing as slavery. I have a
problem with this notion, because it would seem to imply the
obverse, but the obverse is not true. If I am well off, it does not
make me free. If I am poor, it does not necessarily make me a slave.
Self-government does not mean the ability to build a building if one
desires; such a materialistic definition is not useful here. The capac-
ity for self-government has to do with one's ability to properly use
those opportunities for choice that one has. That is why the history
of black people in America contradicts Professor Strossen's implica-
tions that poverty breeds passivity and dependency.2 Black people
in America were extremely poor people throughout most of our his-
tory. That poverty was not only a matter of economic hardship; it
was also the effects of all kinds of awful barriers tossed before them:
legislative segregation, discrimination, and so forth. With this as a
background, I would ask Professor Strossen whether, as a result of
that poverty and that legislative discrimination, she would argue
with the fact that all of the Frederick Douglass's and all of the un-
sung heroes who went to work every day, maintained their families,
rode up and down in the elevators, took in other people's washing
and so forth, also raised young people who valued their education,
went to school, improved themselves, and, in many cases improved
themselves for the sake of opportunities they would never enjoy in
that generation, because they understood intrinsically that the pur-
suit of their own qualities was an end in itself, regardless of the re-
sults it produced. Understanding of one's own dignity is not lost in
poverty. The challenges of poverty can increase understanding un-
til it reaches the kind of strength that it reached in the black commu-
nity in the 1960s; a strength which provided the spark for a
nonviolent movement that moved society where no one thought it
could go, and did so without the awful violence that many feared
accompany it. As much as this country's majority congratulates it-
self upon its great largesse and understanding of the need for jus-
tice, I beg to differ. We avoided a blood bath in this country
because of the quality of souls of black Americans, not because of
the majority's wisdom or generosity. We avoided it because though
we chose a course that was more demanding of our character, it was
also better for our country.
One final point needs to be emphasized. Poverty does not
breed depravity, nor does it degrade the poor. This view is at the
heart of much misguided policy and consequently we have been
willing to accept degradation in the name of eliminating poverty
when we have a whole group of people before us who should re-
2 See Nadine Strossen, Blaming the Victim: A Critique ofAttacks on Affirmative Action, 77
CORNELL L. REV. 974, 979 (1992).
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mind us that it is possible, despite poverty, racism, and injustices, to
maintain those qualities of soul that become beacons for this nation
in its time of crisis and need. Martin Luther King, Jr. is but one
illustration of this proposition-that we must be careful not to
equate poverty with slavery, and not to adopt those remedies for
poverty that will destroy the capacities and qualities of soul, family,
heart, courage, and spirit that years of poverty and discrimination
never tarnished.
As for empiricism, I have not done any empirical analysis either
of the effects of affirmative action or social welfare programs. I did,
however, take a ride-along the other night in the District of Colum-
bia, and if you want empirical evidence of the impact of these
problems and the misguided solutions to them, try doing such a
ride-along. You will see some of the bad effects of affirmative ac-
tion. The police officers with whom I spoke told me about the dele-
terious effects of lowering the standards for admission at the police
academy. They told me how difficult their job on the streets has
become because of those lowered standards and how affirmative ac-
tion has generally degraded the standards of performance of the po-
lice force. These comments came, by the way, from black, not white,
officers; thus race was not a factor.
Doing such a ride-along will show you another effect of these
problems and the misguided solutions to them. Driving through
some of these neighborhoods, you will see trash all over the front
stoops, lawns never mowed and young children wandering the
streets unguided and unsupervised. When I was growing up, my
family was poor, but my mother had a maxim: you cannot do what
you cannot do, but you can do what you can do. This is one of those
obvious things which everyone agrees with once it is said. These
people were not doing what they could do. Their failure has noth-
ing to do with poverty; it has to do with inner will. That inner will is
sapped by those remedies that tell you that poverty is an excuse for
degradation. There is no such excuse. This, if anything, has been
the lesson of our black experience in America.
PROFESSOR KENNEDY:
Dr. Keyes continues to invest more energy in warding off what
he perceives to be the problems of governmental intervention than
in addressing himself to the misery that surrounds impoverished
people. Indeed, in his last comments, one might get the impression
that poverty was a positive good. Sure, there have been people who
have surmounted poverty without government assistance. Frederick
Douglass overcame slavery. But so what; some people will triumph
over any obstacle. Does that mean that we should cease, as a soci-
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ety, to remove socially-created obstacles that cripple people in their
pursuit of happiness?
And what about children? Dr. Keyes has put a lot of emphasis
on "choice." Sure, there are people all across the socioeconomic
spectrum who choose to be slovenly. But what about the child, one
day old, who is born to parents who are impoverished, who have no
skills, who have grown up in horrible circumstances, and who have
not had people around to help show them a better way? That is just
a matter of luck-bad luck-being born in such circumstances. And
in these United States of America, if you are born in such circum-
stances, chances are you are going to end up living a life confined by
all sorts of terrible obstacles.
PROFESSOR STROSSEN:
In responding to my speech, Dr. Keyes seized on the point I
made concerning "the maldistribution of liberty." Perhaps that was
not the most descriptive phrase. I agree with Dr. Keyes in some
abstract, philosophical sense that liberty cannot be distributed; it is
something that all of us innately possess. Whether one describes
this notion of inherent rights as an aspect of natural law, or calls it
human rights, we all endorse it in some sense. We must, however,
distinguish between the theoretical liberty which belongs to all of us
equally, as a matter of philosophy, and the actual liberty which, as a
matter of practical experience, is differentially available to each of
US.
In its abstraction, Dr. Keyes' point ignores some very crucial
realities of life in late 20th century America. The ability to exercise
liberty, which Dr. Keyes recognizes as crucial, is profoundly affected
by government intervention and government patterns of resource
distribution. We cannot ignore that fact. Also, the deprivation of
liberty by government agents and private actors is profoundly and
disproportionately felt by certain groups in our society.
Dr. Keyes emphasizes the conceptual notion that we all have
liberty, all human beings from the richest to the poorest, those of us
who are gathered in this luxurious hotel as well as those who are
sleeping outside on the sidewalk. He stresses that, in an abstract
sense, we are all equal in our liberty. But such an abstract sense of
liberty is impoverished and sterile. It reminds me of the biting ob-
servation by Anatole France, that "the law, in its majestic equality,
forbids the rich as well as the poor to sleep under bridges, to beg in
the streets, and to steal bread."3 Our society has a richer, more
3 Quote originally from LE Lys ROUGE (1894), ch. 7, reprinted in FAMILIAR QUOTA-
TIONS JOHN BARTL=r 655 (Little Brown Co., 1980).
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meaningful, concept of liberty, which seeks to assure equal opportu-
nities to actually exercise rights.
To those of you who think that the government should not be
involved in facilitating or impeding people's ability to exercise their
liberties, I suggest that you are blinking reality. For better or for
worse-probably many Federalist Society members think it is for
worse-the fact is that our government is interventionist, and has
distributed resources, including resources that could fairly be
viewed as fundamental prerequisites for the meaningful exercise of
liberties, in very unequal ways.
For example, many theorists agree that for people to experi-
ence fully the blessings of liberty, and to participate in self-govern-
ment, a fundamental prerequisite is education. Yet we all know how
maldistributed public resources are in terms of education. The
American Civil Liberties Union is currently involved in cases all over
this country, including some that are now before the United States
Supreme Court, where all parties agree that governmental resources
are allocated disproportionately to public schools on the basis of
race. Throughout this country, in large cities as well as in rural ar-
eas, schools with predominately African American student bodies
have fewer resources in terms of books, teachers, and all other crite-
ria.4 -Thus, thirty-seven years after the Supreme Court's landmark
ruling that the Constitution was violated by racially segregated pub-
lic schools which had been defended as "separate but equal,"5 our
nation's public schools are separate and unequal on the basis of race.
The educational situation illustrates the fact that, in our society,
government is a powerful actor that severely limits the ability of
some people to exercise their liberties fully, while at the same time
substantially enhancing the ability of other people to exercise their
liberties fully. There is a racial pattern to this disparity. Let us not
ignore this reality.
Just as government facilitates the exercise of freedoms on a ra-
cially unequal basis, so too government deprives individuals of lib-
erty on a racially unequal basis. Likewise, private actors invade
liberties in a racially disparate fashion. I will give only a few of the
innumerable examples that could be provided.
In terms of governmental action, the government's greatest op-
portunity to deprive people of liberty most directly is through the
criminal justice system. Study after study shows that throughout the
entire criminal justice process, the targets of governmental inva-
sions tend disproportionately to be people of color. Disparate treat-
4 JONATHAN KoZOL, SAVAGE INEQUALITIES: CHILDREN IN AMERICAN SCHOOLS
(1991).
5 Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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ment begins with who is stopped on the street, who is questioned,
who is subjected to the sweep searches, and other surveillance tech-
niques that the Supreme Court has upheld. Such invasions of lib-
erty frequently occur when people of color are dressed in certain
ways or are in certain neighborhoods where they "don't belong," or
are driving expensive cars, and so on.
Over and over again we see racially discriminatory patterns of
police brutality, which is a particularly dramatic form of governmen-
tal deprivation of liberty. People were shocked when they witnessed
the Los Angeles Police Department's videotaped beating of Rodney
King on television. Statistics about nationwide patterns of police
behavior show that it was no coincidence that the victim of that beat-
ing was an African-American man. 6 Throughout the country, police
brutality is disproportionately inflicted on the basis of race.
And the same pattern occurs in private victimization. The most
complete deprivation of liberty is the taking of life itself, and we are
all familiar with the terrible statistics that homicide is the leading
cause of death among young black men.7 Those who are not killed
are disproportionately incarcerated and subject to the death pen-
alty. So we cannot ignore the fact that there is a dramatic, racially-
based maldistribution of liberty in this society.
Next, I want to address Dr. Keyes' question about Frederick
Douglass. Echoing what Randy Kennedy has already said, of course
it is wonderful that certain extraordinary individuals can triumph
over even the ultimate race-based deprivation of liberty-slavery.
But how many other "Frederick Douglasses" have never fulfilled
their potential, to the detriment of not only themselves, but our
whole society, because they were not able to take that enormous
step of surmounting slavery and other forms of incapacitation? Of
course, it is hard to prove a negative. That is a challenge I often
face when I talk about free speech. Defenders of speech regulations
frequently note that, despite these regulations, some people still are
expressing themselves. But we all believe that for every person
speech regulations fail to deter, there are many others who experi-
ence what we refer to in the free speech context as a "chilling ef-
fect." A parallel phenomenon obtains in the context of racial
discrimination.
6 Andrew H. Malcolm, Change in Enforcement is Said to Cut Violence Between Police and
Public, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 2, 1990; Elaine Rivera, Minorities Feel Singled Out; They Account for
92.676 of 1990 Killings, NEWSDAY, March 12, 1991.
7 Sharon Shakid, We're Saying If We Don't Try Something New, We Are Doomed, USA
TODAY, Aug. 15, 1991; Lynne Duke, Conference Studies Plight of Black Males; Scholar's Por-
trait Shows Endangered Population, THE WASHINGTON POST, May 23, 1991.
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Tragically, we will never know how many other "Frederick
Douglasses"-and, might I add, "Frederica Douglasses"-might
have emerged had it not been for discrimination. I use that latter
example advisedly because I recently saw a staged version of Vir-
ginia Woolf's wonderful book, A Room of One's Own,8 in which she
recounts the fictional story of Shakespeare's sister. She imagines
the difficulties that would have confronted a female Shakespeare-a
woman who had all of the talents and yet none of the opportunities
available to male writers in Elizabethan England. Surely there were
many women who could have been inspired and inspiring writers,
but sadly, we will never have the opportunity to read their plays and
poetry.
Finally, I want to end by addressing the first point that Dr.
Keyes made with the metaphor of a footrace. He said that it is not
helpful to declare that somebody who comes in sixth has won the
race. I submit that merely unshackling somebody who has been en-
slaved, and putting him at the starting line for the race, also does
not help. In that vein, I would like to quote a powerful statement
about the moral imperativeness of affirmative action which, coinci-
dentally, uses the footrace metaphor that Dr. Keyes invoked. It is
from a speech by President Lyndon Johnson at Howard University
in 1965. 9 He said:
Freedom is not enough. You do not wipe away the scars of centu-
ries by saying: Now you are free to go where you want, and do as
you desire, and choose the leaders you please. You do not take a
person, who, for years has been hobbled by chains, liberate him,
bring him up to the starting line of a race, and then say, "you are
free to compete with all the others," and still justly believe that
you have been completely fair. Thus it is not enough just to open
the gates of opportunity.10
Thank you.
REYNOLDS:
I do not need to offer the observation that this has been a won-
derfully enlightening and invigorating discussion. I thank all the
panelists. Since I am the moderator, I will exercise a prerogative to
have the last word on one or two brief points.
With respect to "casting the net wider," I cannot let Mr. Ken-
nedy's challenge pass. I did make the comment, and I believed
firmly in it. When I suggest as an appropriate solution "casting a
8 VIRGINIA WOOLF, A ROOM OF ONE'S OWN (First Harvest/Harcourt Brace 1989)
(1929).
9 Commencement Address at Howard University: "To Fulfill These Rights," Pres-
ident Lyndon B. Johns, Pub. Papers II, 635 (June 4, 1965).
10 Id. at 636.
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wider net," it is not to exclude individuals already benefitting from
outreach programs, but to include others not being solicited for
available job opportunities. Employers must cast the recruitment
"'net" as wide as they can so that all may be considered in an even-
handed and fair manner for whatever opportunities exist. One of
the real mischiefs of employment practices is that the good-old-boy
network fills available positions so quickly that many qualified peo-
ple do not hear about the position until long after it has been filled.
When I was head of the Civil Rights Division, I knew that in
order to make affirmative action meaningful, we had to break down
this system. Casting the net widely into those communities that or-
dinarily never hear about many job opening until the vacancies are
filled enables the people in those communities to be considered for
the job. I was not suggesting that this be done without considera-
tion for others who are certainly interested in the available jobs.
Rather, it was my desire to ensure that all who were interested had
the chance to be considered. It was in that sense that I made the
remarks about casting a wider net.
I would also simply add an observation to Nadine's last com-
ment about Lyndon Johnson's well-known and often-cited speech.
It is important to keep in mind there are shackles which many peo-
ple bear. One of the most urgent public interests is to find ways to
remove those shackles and allow individuals to realize their full ca-
pacity. I have maintained, and continue to maintain, that it is a cruel
hoax to bring people to the starting gate and line everybody up, but
then fail to remove the worst of all shackles: selection by race or
skin color. Hypocracy of this sort constitutes one of the real
problems with affirmative action preferential programs. These pro-
grams effectively tell minorities that they are now in the race and
that they can run. Yet, as affirmative-action runners, the one shackle
that weighs heaviest binds their ankles. No matter how hard they
run, the affirmative-action selection process leans on the same dis-
criminatory feature that we have for so long been trying to
eliminate.
One final observation. While listening to these panelists, it
struck me that the discussion we have had today under the heading
"Entitlements, Empowerment, and Victimization" is similar to other
discussions I have heard in perhaps different contexts but over and
over again when the issue of affirmative action comes up. The ills
and concerns that everyone focuses on, understands, and recognizes
are those which all agree still exist and need to be addressed. The
solutions, it seems, break down along the same predictable lines, the
contest is between equal opportunity versus equal results, between
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individual rights versus group entitlements. We heard the same
themes today. It is for each of you to pick the side with which you
feel most comfortable.
